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Abstract 
The scarification in Aké is invested with major significance apropos Soyinka’s ideas on 
African subjectivity. Scarification among the Yoruba is one of the rites of passage associated 
with personal development. Scarification literally and metaphorically “opens” the person up 
socially and cosmically. Personal formation and self-realization are enabled by the Yoruba 
social code brought into being by its mythology. The meaning of the scarification incident in 
Aké is profoundly different. Determined by the form of autobiography which creates a self-
constituting subject, the enabling Yoruba socio-cultural context is elided. The story of 
Soyinka’s personal development is allegorical of the story of the development of the modern 
African subject. For Soyinka, the African subject is a rational subject whose constitution 
precludes the splitting of the scientific and spiritual which is a consequence of the Cartesian 
rupture. The African subject should be open to other subjects and the object world.  
 
Subjectivity constituted by the autobiographical mode closes off the opening up symbolically 
signaled by scarification.  
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The most profoundly symbolic moment in Wole Soyinka’s childhood autobiography, Aké, is 
the occasion when the young Wole receives from his paternal grandfather the arc-shaped 
slashes on his ankles and wrists which ritually and physically mark a stage in his development 
from childhood to adulthood. The significance of the incident is emphasized by the fact that it 
is referred to again in the adult memoir, Ibadan. The event acquires a charge also since it is a 
catalyst in the formation of Soyinka as artist. Scarification among the Yoruba, as will be 
shown, literally and metaphorically embodies the road in life’s journey. Scarification, 
furthermore, is presided over by its tutelary deity, Ògún, the god of iron. Ògún for this reason 
is the patron deity of metalworkers and body artists, those who forge anew out of the smithy 
of creativity. Ritual scarification thus brings together in dynamic association Ògún and the 
road, out of which flows the idea of self-realization through artistic creativity. It might not be 
an exaggeration to suggest that in Soyinka’s self-reflection, the incident of childhood 
scarification is the moment at which Soyinka, the artist, is inspired, or ‘wrought’. Even more 
significantly, the formation of Soyinka as artist simultaneously embodies a conception of 
African subjectivity. In order to show the symbolic value of the incident of the scarification to 
Soyinka’s ideas about the African subject, the genre of autobiography itself needs first to be 
considered. Autobiography as a life narrative needs to be explored to understand the nature 
of the self which the form constitutively assumes. 
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Two recent overviews of postcolonial autobiography need to be considered here, namely, 
David Huddart’s Postcolonial Theory and Autobiography (2008) and Bart Moore-Gilbert’s 
Postcolonial Life-Writing (2009). Both works examine the ways in which postcolonial 
autobiographical forms challenge the sovereign, universal self identified with colonial 
modernity. Huddart’s exploration foregrounds the centrality of autobiography, broadly 
defined, to the articulation of a postcolonial theory which, at its core, challenges conceptions 
of the self assumed by colonial modernity. Huddart points out that autobiographies or 
autobiographical reflections are associated with virtually all of the theorists of postcoloniality, 
among them, Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha. But Huddart 
makes the very astute observation that postcolonial autobiographical forms associated with 
these theorists simultaneously challenge the idea of the person in non-modern societies. 
Huddart suggests: “We might actually argue that the autobiographical transformation of 
postcolonial theory is concerned with transforming notions of universal subjectivity that 
themselves disrupt the possibility of community” (2008: 4). Although Soyinka is never 
associated with (and probably would not desire to be identified with) postcolonial theory, 
autobiography in Soyinka plays a similar role to that which Huddart identifies in postcolonial 
theory. Likewise, the tensions which emerge in Soyinka’s reflections on, in this case, African 
subjectivity, are relevant to postcolonial autobiography generally. In fundamental ways, 
postcolonial theory remains bound up with colonial modernity in the automatic assumption 
of the concept of the self disengaged from a social code upon which reflections on the person 
are conceived. The idea of a self disengaged from a social code will be discussed fully in 
relation to Soyinka’s childhood autobiography. However, the idea emerges clearly also in 
Moore-Gilbert’s analysis of the ways in which postcolonial autobiography, or to use the 
preferred term in this work, life-writing, challenges the form of subjectivity associated with 
the colonial moment, but remains imbricated with it. Moore-Gilbert considers various 
examples of postcolonial life-writing from around the world. The life-writing he explores 
appears to challenge the centred, autonomous, sovereign self associated with colonial 
modernity. Moore-Gilbert finds an overlap in the strategies employed by these narratives of 
self with the strategies used by North Atlantic feminist life-writing. These strategies include 
various narrative techniques to decentre the centred self. Some postcolonial life-writing 
exposes the ways in which the independent, autonomous self is “relational” or, in other 
words, formed in relationships with others.  Often postcolonial life-writing, Moore-Gilbert 
suggests, challenges the subject of colonial modernity through testing the generic boundaries 
of autobiography itself. In the case of Wole Soyinka’s Aké, Moore-Gilbert finds that this 
autobiography confronts the idea of the universality of the modern subject through 
constructing a thoroughly located self, where “[t]he importance of place…is foregrounded in 
the very title of [Soyinka’s] text” (2009: 54), since Aké is also the name of the district where 
the author’s childhood home is situated. However, Moore-Gilbert’s analysis of postcolonial 
life-writing, like Huddart’s exploration of the connections between postcolonial 
autobiography and theory, assume a disengaged self whose prior constitution is not put into 
question. Moore-Gilbert accepts the already individuated, free self presented in Soyinka’s 
text. Referring to the way in which the young Wole shuttles between Christianity and 
paganism, Moore-Gilbert concludes that: “[c]onsequently Wole is not forced to ground 
himself within any singular cultural identity. Indeed, selecting as he pleases from each 
 
 
tradition, he also proves himself capable of rebellion against both” (2009: 57) The “Self” 
presented in the narrative thus suggests to Moore-Gilbert a subject fundamentally free to 
choose identity or identities at will.  This is emphasised again when Moore-Gilbert considers 
the significance of locatedness and interconnectedness to this conception of the subject: “By 
choosing Aké for his title, Soyinka appears to wish to construct a relational Self…which 
recognises the determining influence on his formation not just of “place”, but also of the 
community he grows up in.” (2009: 57). What is taken for granted in both of these recent 
works on autobiography is the existence of a very particular kind of “Self”, in fundamental 
ways a “free Self”, which elusively occludes itself since it seems entirely natural. An 
interesting lack in both these works is the absence of attention to the ideas of the person 
constructed in various oratures and also various local literatures which might show up the 
ways in which the prior “Self”, which is assumed, itself needs to be analyzed. An exploration 
of the significance of the scarification in Soyinka’s childhood autobiography sheds light on the 
question suggested here.        
 
Wole Soyinka’s Aké occupies a special position among his autobiographical works as indeed 
autobiography stands among his prose writings. Within the ambit of a broad definition of 
autobiography, one may count four other works in Soyinka’s oeuvre: the 1973 work, The Man 
Died (Prison Notes), Ìsarà: A Voyage Around “Essay” (1990), Ibadan: the Penkelemes 
Years: A Memoir 1946-1965 (1994) and the most recent publication You Must Set Forth at 
Dawn: A Memoir (2006). Soyinka makes a curious theoretical distinction between 
autobiography and novel through repeated assertions of an engaged interest in the former, 
with just a cursory nod in the direction of the latter. The distinction drawn and the preference 
attested are belied, however, by the author’s practice. On more than one occasion in 
interviews, Soyinka denies an interest in writing or reading novels beyond a childhood 
predilection for Dickens (1992: 102). The author is far more open about writing 
autobiography. However, in these works too, with the exception of Aké, Soyinka cautiously 
emphasizes that there are external prods which encourage him to write life narratives, other 
than the personal need for self-reflection. According to the acknowledgements of You Must 
Set Forth at Dawn, these prompts include the need to capture erased histories in writing and 
the need to satisfy the interest of literary students and journalists in the details of his life  
(2007: n.p.).  
 
However, having established a generic distinction between the novel, which is putatively 
fictional, and autobiography, which is commonly assumed to be factual, Soyinka begins, 
paradoxically, to break the distinction down. In the foreword to Ibadan, an autobiography in 
which the author figure is given the pseudonym “Maren”, Soyinka suggests that the narrative 
“does not pretend to be anything but faction, that much abused genre which attempts to 
fictionalize facts and events, the proportion of fact to fiction being totally at the discretion of 
the author” (1994: ix) [emphasis in the original]. Soyinka borrows the portmanteau term 
“faction” from the new journalism of America in the late 1960s where the techniques of 
fiction were applied to reportage. By contrast, the conventions of journalism were applied to 
the novel in the context of the non-fiction novels of Truman Capote and Norman Mailer 
(Baldick, 2008: 124; Cuddon, 1999: 302).  The concept of “faction,” which describes a blend 
 
 
of fact and fiction at the author’s discretion, aptly describes all of the autobiographical works 
and memoirs, with the exception of Aké, for which the author seems to claim a veracity 
beyond the poetic truth of fiction. With Aké, Soyinka appears to be asserting more than the 
frequently upheld idea that fiction refers to “lies which tell the truth”.  Instead, the author 
claims for this autobiography an ontic truth which derives from the fact that it constitutes a 
remembrance of childhood, which, for Soyinka, encompasses the years before the age of 
eleven: “Any testament after the ‘age of innocence’ is a lie, or half-truth, doctored truth, 
selective truth or annotated truth, or – in simple diction – a confection of sorts” (1994: x). On 
the question of Soyinka’s rejection of the novel and embrace of autobiography, Biodun 
Jeyifo’s intuition may be the right one. Jeyifo suggests that the elaborate distinction Soyinka 
draws between novel and autobiography is ultimately untenable in his writing practice; this 
distinction originates in the poor critical reception of, in particular, the second of Soyinka’s 
two novels, Season of Anomy (2004: 169-170). To reiterate: Soyinka suggests a preference for 
autobiography over novel, but in the proposal that life writing is inherently fictional, breaks 
down the boundary between the two genres. Soyinka intimates, however, that the childhood 
self-recollections narrated in Aké capture an essential truth, which contradicts the trend 
towards the idea of the “constructedness” of reality presented elsewhere in his thought.        
 
The boundary between novel and autobiography which Soyinka constructs and then, 
paradoxically, blurs, suggests an ambiguity which attends the eighteenth-century origins of 
both genres. The eighteenth-century novel originates in the ruse of the true account of a real 
life, as attested by Clarissa (1748-1749), Moll Flanders (1722) and Robinson Crusoe (1719) 
among others. Intimations of the subjectivity or fictional nature of the autobiography inhere 
in the paradox of its foundational premise: to give the completely veracious narrative of the 
life would be to present the life itself. The re-presentation of the life thus is inherently and 
inescapably fictional. Indeed, the constitutive impulse of both the autobiography and the 
Bildungsroman, that sub-genre of the novel which seems to define the novel itself, is the 
representation of the life which develops out of its own internal resources, what Joe Slaughter 
refers to as the Bildungsroman’s “complex of inherency in becoming” (2006: 1415). In this 
respect, Aké is framed, scripted and determined by the naturalizing and naturalized 
assumptions of the Bildungsroman even as, in some ways, it appears to challenge these 
assumptions.  
 
The template of the classical realist Bildungsroman is structured around the figure of the 
precocious small town youth at odds (as a consequence of too much “unsupervised reading”) 
with family, in particular the father, and society. Education takes the hero from country to 
city, a journey both literal and metaphorical, where, after failed romance, the hero ultimately 
finds both life partner and station in society enabling social accommodation and a return 
home (Buckley, 1974: 17-18). The art of the novel of development allows the hero to assume a 
social role apparently entirely the product of his own volition and experience in the world. 
This development in the realist Bildungsroman is presented in linear time and is 
paradoxically teleological since the origins and trajectory of the life must subtly but clearly 
foreshadow its conclusion. In other words, the novel of development needs to construct a 
world within which the character’s decisions and actions have a logical inevitability which 
 
 
derive from their internal consistency. The dynamic which drives the narrative is horizontal. 
Vertical intervention in the form of the shaping and foreclosing idea of providence or fate, or 
a sense of predetermination governed by the ideal of custom or tradition, collapses the 
epistemological assumption upon which this narrative form is based.      
 
Aké assumes the pattern of the classical novel of development with a few key differences. 
Given the cultural provenance of this autobiography, one assumes that the destabilization of 
the unitary and disengaged worldview of the narrator would derive from the Yoruba culture 
for which the author has been an enthusiastic spokesman. The foregrounding of the 
individual, which is the hallmark of the autobiography, is definitive also, with some 
qualification, in Yoruba cultural forms. Clear illustration of the significance of the person in 
Yoruba culture is indicated, for example, by the related discursive practices of oríkì and ìtàn 
chants (Yai, 1994: 107-108). Both oríkì and ìtàn are recitations, like biography and 
autobiography, which reflect on the lives of singular persons. What distinguishes ìtàn from 
oríkì, however, is the historical dimension of the ìtàn chant. John Pemberton III defines the 
ìtàn oral histories as follows: 
Such histories recall the ancestral founder of the household, refer to the town or region 
from which the ancestor came with his followers, indicating (often cryptically) reasons 
for their departure, the vicissitudes of their journey, and the welcome they received 
upon arriving in the present location due to the particular skills or heroic deeds of the 
ancestor…Above all else, the ìtàn remembers those men and women who brought fame 
to the family. (1994: 120) 
Like the literary forms which foreground the life of the individual, the Yoruba oral history 
individuates, traces development as a journey through life and celebrates the final 
reincorporation of the person. 
 
The oríkì chants, however, more clearly indicate the fundamental difference between the 
Yoruba forms of reflection on the individual life and the autobiography/Bildungsroman. 
Karin Barber’s research on the oríkì is the most extensive and detailed. Barber defines oríkì 
as “a genre of Yoruba oral poetry that could be described as attributions or appellations: 
collections of epithets, pithy or elaborated, which are addressed to a subject” (1991: 1). Barber 
eschews the common definition of oríkì as “praise poetry” since the oríkì operate more as  
“verbal salutes” (1994: 151), identifying what is unique and essential about the subject rather 
than paying tribute only to the person’s positive qualities. Oríkì thus also sometimes insult or 
embarrass their subjects. Performance of oríkì requires some training, but is open to anyone 
with the verbal and imaginative talent. Oríkì, like written biographies, foreground the life of 
exceptional people.  
 
A special form of oríkì is associated with wedding ceremonies. Unlike other forms of oríkì 
chants, the verbal salute of the bride is self-reflexive. In this respect it may be associated with 
the written autobiography. The oríkì of the bride is referred to as “rara iyawo”. Barber 
defines the subject of rara iyawo as follows: 
Everything the bride says in rara iyawo is intended to direct attention back to herself. 
The genre, in fact, is a long reflection on, and dramatization of, the bride’s change of 
 
 
status. It asks the audience to look at her, observe her glory, recognize the transition 
she is undertaking. The verses [are]…invitations to the onlooker to acknowledge that 
this particular girl is at this moment embarking on married life…Her performance is 
thus self-reflexive, a dramatization of the actual moment at which she is the centre of 
attention…The oriki circles back to the bride and becomes a reflection on her state. 
(1991: 113-115) [emphasis in original] 
 
The representational impulse of both rara iyawo and the autobiography are similar; namely, 
the discursive construction of the narrator’s life. What Aké seems to share in common with 
rara iyawo, furthermore, is the fact that both this autobiography and the oral genre appear to 
open the reflection of the self up to dimensions outside of the limits of comprehension of a 
realist worldview, where realism refers to the epistemological transformation associated with 
the Cartesian break. The narrating subject in Aké presents itself as “boundariless” in much 
the same way that the subject of rara iyawo and oríkì generally are constituted as “open” 
selves. In both the text under consideration and the oral forms, time is not teleological. 
Instead, the past is shown to be immanent in the present and the present in the past. 
Likewise, superficially, both the oral and script forms of self-reflection appear open to a 
spiritual dimension. Oríkì, generally, are considered to be “living link[s] through which 
relationships with the orisa, the ‘gods’, are conducted” (Barber, 1991: 4). Thus, superficially, 
the autobiography seems to reflect in script the worldview inherent in Yoruba oral forms. 
 
However, rara iyawo and oríkì, broadly, are profoundly different in their constitutive 
formation compared with Aké. The Yoruba verbal salutes exalt the person in the context of 
the person’s lineage. As Barber suggests, “[t]hey provide a way of thinking about social 
relationships within and between families” (1991: 4). While kinship (both nuclear and 
extended) is a significant dimension of Soyinka’s autobiography, the narrator is not 
constituted as a person organically out of these relationships. Instead, the narrator 
autonomously defines himself in relation to family and forebears. By contrast, lineage in oríkì 
and ìtàn is not part of a self-reflexive project. Barber emphasizes that in this context, 
“[i]ndividual identity is constituted out of communal identity: and at the same time it is 
through the salutation of the individual that group identity is reaffirmed” (1991: 250). The 
verbal forms reflect on status in the context of the system within which status is constituted.  
Oríkì and ìtàn do not present a subjectivity which assumes the possibility of a worldview 
somehow outside of the system which constitutes it in the first place. 
 
Thus, what makes the assumptions of the oríkì and ìtàn different from the fundamental 
assumption of Soyinka’s childhood autobiography, is that the oríkì and ìtàn are significantly 
“institutionalized”. They represent a socially recognized “script” in a drama which creates 
self-reflexive persons through inescapable recognition of the common horizon within which 
each one is empowered. In terms of this common horizon, the bride who moves through the 
town reciting the rara iyawo chant makes her own unique journey in life, but she does not 
regard herself as mistress of her own destiny. She is not free in her self-construction to 
determine, for example, that she will reject the convention and expect it of her future 
husband instead. The bride is not at liberty as an individual to fashion her own “convention,” 
 
 
since the existing practice arises out of a conception of an ideal code for women and for men, 
reflecting an idea of a natural order for which Yoruba mythology is the immediate 
apprehension.  
 
But this does not mean that Yoruba culture is static. What it means is that meaningful 
changes are adaptations to transformed contexts, which engage both the cultural ideal and 
the shifting circumstance. Such transformations enjoy a thoroughgoing consistency in which 
individual and collective are not present as a dichotomy. WhiIe not entirely inconceivable in 
the contemporary context, the bride expecting the convention of rara iyawo from her 
husband-to-be would be considered ludicrous: this absurdity highlights the code which 
constitutes the Yoruba ideal. With the autobiography, as will be shown, the horizon held in 
common is lost, or rather, more correctly, sublimated, since the narrator of the autobiography 
is presented as a self-engendering and self-determining subject. Aké thus dramatizes the 
production of Soyinka’s ideal African subject, theoretically defined in the lectures published 
as The Blackman and the Veil. In these lectures Soyinka presents as integral to black 
subjectivity the “right to self-regulation, self-direction and the production of [its] own 
future…a simple task of self-redefinition” (1993: 7). In this assertion, Soyinka accepts both 
the conception of self as individual and the racial category of blackness constituted by the 
“other” world, which it is the object of the lectures to challenge.  
 
I now wish to return to the question of what makes Aké unusual in the context of the classic 
novel of development generally and African life narratives specifically. With regard to the 
relationship between autobiography and Bildungsroman Apollo Amoko suggests, using Aké 
as an illustrative text, that in the “African context” there are “considerable correspondences 
and convergences” between the two genres. Furthermore, he argues that “Autobiographies 
and Bildungsromane participate in the same conversation regarding the fundamental nature 
of African societies in the wake of the encounter with colonialism” (2009: 195-196). For 
Biodun Jeyifo, by contrast, Aké is “not a conventional Bildungsroman,” since “it is not a story 
of growing up through an embittering loss of innocence or of a traumatic shedding of illusions 
through a very painful experience” (2004: 192-193). What is suggested here, by contrast, is 
that it is precisely because of the pressures of writing an African autobiography that this 
distinctive feature of the Bildungsroman (namely, the “embittering loss of innocence” or 
“traumatic shedding of illusions”) is elided in Soyinka’s text. The author’s note to one of 
Soyinka’s most well-known plays, Death and the King’s Horseman, makes it clear that 
Soyinka identifies the “Colonial Factor” as “an incident, a catalytic incident merely” in the 
entry into modernity (Soyinka, 2002b n.p.). Soyinka’s broad project, as will be argued in 
more detail momentarily, is to present modern identity as universal and, furthermore, to 
demonstrate the authentic African origin of modern subjectivity, which constitutively 
precludes the Cartesian rupture of poetic or spiritual modes from scientific ones. Kwame 
Anthony Appiah’s critique that Soyinka projects the Yoruba mythopoetic part for the African 
whole is noted on the question of a recuperation of poetic or spiritual modes of perception. 
(1992: 79-82). Noted also is the observation that the idea of an “Africa” with a unique 
spiritual identity itself is a response to modern forms of both colonialism and slavery. The art 
in Aké, like the art of the novel of formation, consists in presenting this project entirely 
 
 
naturally, emerging purely out of the observation and rational ordering of experience of the 
developing child.     
  
The selection of childhood incidents narrated in Aké presents a preternaturally intelligent 
child who at the age of two strategizes his own admission to the school at which his father is 
the headmaster. The text abounds in references to the young Wole who is an insatiable 
reader, an addiction from which the family repeatedly try to save him, inculcating instead the 
lessons of real life. While not exaggerating the differences between himself, his father and the 
members of the extended family and friends, the autobiography presents its subject as 
egregious in various ways. He attempts to avoid the menial household chores and considers it 
an affront to his dignity to be forced out of his privileged position in the patriarchal bed onto 
the communal mat on the floor. He plots an escape “from a household whose subtle hostilities 
had begun to prickle [his] skin” after, to his mind, irrationally being reprimanded for the theft 
of powdered milk which was not being used anyway (1981: 92). Unlike the classic realist novel 
of formation, romantic attachments do not appear significant to self-realization either in Aké 
or in any of the other autobiographies and marriage is not a defining horizon. There is also no 
staged linear development progressing to self-fulfillment and social accommodation in 
closure. Instead, the narrative adopts the techniques of modernism, which disrupt linear time 
and, through stream of consciousness, presents a consciously subjective and in some ways 
metatextual narrative. The text might be termed episodic if it were not for the subjective 
connections among incidents. The narrative moves from time to time and space to space 
through subjective links. For example, the time sequence of the section of narrative 
describing the young Wole’s conversation with the white officer in Ibara is broken for a long 
aside on the Hausa traders who visit the Aké parsonage simply because the accent of the 
Hausa sergeant present sets off a chain of reminiscences. Similarly the word “rafters” 
(referring to roof beams) shifts the narration from the father’s house in Aké to the 
grandfather’s house in Ísará following the fascination of the subjective consciousness with the 
materiality of the word. The first person narrative shifts from focalization through the child to 
focalization through the adult narrator, returning to the childhood scenes, simultaneously 
conflating times present and past. Like the oríkì chants thus, the narrative shows the past in 
the present and the present in the past, but the framework within which it performs these 
moves is fundamentally transformed. In fact, one might say that the framework is 
internalized.  
 
The motif of life as a journey is central to all paradigms of personal development and Aké is 
no exception. True to the impulse of the autobiography, where the subject is retrospectively 
shown to become whatever he all along was in any case, a childhood foray beyond the walls of 
the home is charged with hugely symbolic proleptic import. At the age of four and a half, the 
young Wole follows the police marching band from Aké to the next town, Ibara. This 
experience subliminally brings together all the elements key to Soyinka’s self-definition. 
Associated with it are notions of rites of passage, where the narrator suggests he had “become 
markedly different from whatever [he] was before the march” (1981: 50). Also strongly 
suggested is the symbolism of the road, which is significant in Yoruba culture and in 
Soyinka’s personal philosophy. The figure who holds all of these conceptions together is 
 
 
Soyinka’s personal deity, Ògún, the god of iron, of circumcisers and of body artists (Drewal, 
1997; Drewal and Mason, 1997) whose significance is signaled in the overt reference to the 
scarifications on the face of the Hausa policeman who comes to the young Wole’s rescue when 
he finds himself far from home. 
 
This journey in miniature is repeated and magnified when, at the age of eleven, the 
autobiographical narrator makes the journey of the Bildungsroman hero from the country 
town of Aké to Government College in the city of Ibadan. In this case, however, in what 
represents a departure from the classic novel of development, the move from country to city 
and the experiences the city allows do not bring accommodative closure. Instead, closure 
marks the beginning of another cycle of development: “It was time to commence the mental 
shifts for admittance to yet another irrational world of adults and their discipline” (1981: 
230). Closure thus reinforces Jeyifo’s insight, noted above, since what is tracked is not the 
disillusionment of a transition from a prelapsarian state of innocence to a state of experience, 
but a continuing negotiation with the world from a subject position presented as natural, in 
the sense that it is outside of culture or ideology, from a subject position presented as 
universal, since it is self-constituting, rather than being formed within a particular, socio-
cultural matrix. In this respect, Aké is different from most other African autobiographies: 
there is no loss, exile, alienation. Thus within the broad frame of the pattern for individual 
formation offered by the realist Bildungsroman, Aké unsettles some formal expectations. 
  
Aké, however, is fully inserted into the fundamental assumption of the 
autobiography/Bildungsroman: the assumption of a “disengaged” subjectivity which 
constructs, out of its apprehension of experience, a worldview. Since the 
autobiography/Bildungsroman enacts, in the sense of literally dramatizing, its foundational 
assumption of “procedural rationality”, this form of subjectivity is also presented as 
transparent, “natural”. The idea of a rationality which is procedural, where truth depends on 
how it is acquired, eliding the prior production of the thinking subject, rather than 
substantive, where the framework which enables the subject is acknowledged, is fully 
elaborated in the work of the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor (1989).  The procedurally 
rational subject is a modern subject. What procedural rationality occludes is the substantively 
rational framework of mythological apprehensions of the world upon which it depends, but 
which it rejects. In other words, the procedurally rational subject, which is the subject 
represented in the narrative of Aké, cannot be formed outside of some substantively rational 
account of its coming into being. Substantive rationality constitutively assumes a collective 
and relatively certain view of the world determined by custom or tradition, in various ways 
among different cultures, mediated by the transcendental. The person is formed in such 
worldviews out of an obligation to an ideal for the most part held in common. But obligation 
in relation to substantively rational outlooks is not conceived as compulsion. Obligation 
emerges as compulsion only to the extent that a procedurally rational view is able to imagine 
itself outside of, and independent of an ideal held in common. As we shall see, Soyinka 
presents himself in the autobiography as unable to accede to the Yoruba social code. 
Paradoxically, for this reason, the value invested in the scarification, which is meant to open 
up the closed, procedurally rational subject, remains a token gesture merely. 
 
 
 
The procedurally rational assumption which shapes the formation of the subject in Aké, is 
clearly shown in the reading of the novel by Amy Beth Cross. Cross analyses Aké in the 
context of a number of other African works of fiction and non-fiction for what they reveal 
about the entry of African writers into institutions of higher education. Cross suggests that 
what makes Aké stand out from similar works is the fact that Soyinka presents himself as 
independently learning “what was important about learning and development” (1996: 24). 
One witnesses in the autobiography the young Wole self-reflexively “telling himself stories” 
(1996: 24). His learning emerges as entirely “relational” (1996: 24). It is learning “in which 
the environment speaks to him and he to it” (1996: 24). In other words, what Cross’s analysis 
suggests but does not articulate, is that the development of the young Wole is presented as a 
procedurally rational self-reflexive project, within which the substantively rational social 
worldview, which is its prerequisite, is entirely elided. 
 
Cross reiterates the observation of James Olney in his comprehensive study of African 
autobiography that “striving for education” (1973: 44) is a “controlling principle” (1973: 45) of 
African autobiography. Almost without exception, the entry into colonial education marks the 
separation from home. The passion of the young Wole for school is such that, as has been 
noted above, he plots his own entry to his father’s school at the age of two and much of the 
latter half of the work describes the trials and tribulations of gaining admission and a 
scholarship to attend Government College, Ibadan. What the child Soyinka discovers at the 
schools he attends in Aké, Abeokuta and then Ibadan, is that educational regimes, and, in 
particular regimes of discipline, appear to defy his conception of logic. Cross suggests that 
what one witnesses in Aké is the reversal of the trope of alienation: “[r]ather than education 
alienating him from himself or his world, school has alienated itself from him” (1996: 26). 
What Cross means by this is that entering the colonial education system almost invariably in 
African Bildingsromane/autobiographies results in the narrator becoming to a certain extent 
a stranger to the worldview which created her/him. A case in point, though not one discussed 
by Cross, where this transformation is perfectly clear, is Tsitsi Dangarembga’s novel, Nervous 
Conditions. In this novel of formation, the entry of the heroine into colonial education is 
described as a “reincarnation” (1988: 92). The newly formed subject constituted by a modern 
regime of personal development views the homestead from which she comes with the eyes of 
an outsider. She has been alienated. In Aké, by contrast, the reversal of the trope of alienation 
can occur precisely since Soyinka presents a subject who educates himself and through 
education constitutes himself. The social and mythological matrix against which the person 
necessarily and inescapably must be constituted has been hidden from view. Instead, the 
young Wole is presented as self-engendering. And this, it appears, is the founding principle of 
eighteenth-century European autobiography, as opposed to other forms of life narrative, both 
oral and verbal. 
 
 Roy Pascal, in one of the most well known surveys of autobiography, suggests that authentic 
autobiography reveals the truth of a life which develops naturally and organically through 
intense experiences which are peculiarly one’s own. Autobiography concerns the discovery of 
spiritual identity of personality through a focus on the self sought in concrete experienced 
 
 
reality. With autobiography, this discovery is always retrospective; thus Pascal notes what he 
terms an “interplay, a collusion, between past and present” where the present must be felt to 
be anticipated by the past (1960: 11). This is territory comprehensively covered by Eldred 
Durosimi Jones in his overview of the autobiographical elements in Aké and does not need to 
be rehearsed here (1973: 23-37). More than just a Bildungsroman, Aké is a Künstlerroman, 
which indexes Soyinka’s future artistic production in the experiences and inspiration of 
childhood.  
  
Thus the central question addressed by Aké is the central question addressed by all other 
autobiographies – “How have I become what I am?” To answer this question, the narrating 
subject needs to be self-reflexively aware of itself. It needs to see itself as distinct from the 
world around it. The narrating subject needs to filter and analyze its experience of the outside 
world in terms of the procedural rationality of an inner sense-making mechanism. And it 
needs, finally, to reflect textually on this process. Aké performs all of these moves.  
 
But Aké carries the weight of another responsibility also. Soyinka’s autobiography needs to 
show that this modern identity, since a modern identity undoubtedly is what he presents, is 
the product of an autochthonous African worldview. This is where the claim that Aké 
represents an “age of innocence” is crucial, since it, unlike the other autobiographies, appears 
to stand outside of history, representing what Soyinka in Myth, Literature and the African 
World refers to as the “universal verities” (1976: xii). History, stricto sensu, is amply 
dramatized in the autobiography in, for example, the representation of the impact of World 
War II and anti-colonial resistance on Aké. But the childhood autobiography stands outside 
of history, as the author intuits in his frequent assertions of its special place in relation to his 
other autobiographies, in the sense that it engages in a distinctive kind of mythmaking which 
denies that it is mythological. The “myth” established by Aké is the African authenticity of the 
subject, whose epistemological and ultimately moral sources are internal to himself. 
  
In this lies the achievement of Aké. The autobiography presents the emergence of the modern 
subject wholly out of African soil, but even more remarkably this is a modern African identity 
which seems to suture the divide of the binaries of the Enlightenment philosophies out of 
which European modernity originates. The opening paragraphs of the autobiography 
irrevocably link the life recounted to place, to the structures, natural and man-made, of Aké 
and simultaneously frame the locale within a Yoruba cosmogony, showing the “earth being” 
of the African, his “gravity-bound apprehension of self” within cosmic totality (1976: 3):   
The sprawling, undulating terrain is all of Aké. More than mere loyalty to the 
personage [sic] gave birth to a puzzle, and a resentment, that God should choose to 
look down on his own pious station, the parsonage compound, from the profane 
heights of Itókò. There was of course the mystery of the Chief’s stable with live horses 
near the crest of the hill, but beyond that, this dizzying road only sheered upwards 
from one noisy market to another, looking down across Ibàràpa and Ita Aké into the 
most secret recesses of the parsonage itself.  
 On a misty day, the steep rise towards Itoko would join the sky. If God did not 
actually live there, there was little doubt that he descended first on its crest, then took 
 
 
his one gigantic stride over those babbling markets – which dared to sell on Sundays – 
into St Peter’s church, afterwards visiting the parsonage for tea with the Canon. (1981: 
1)  
 
In this mischievously humorous sequence which undermines monotheistic cosmology, the 
Christian God descends upon Aké parsonage much as the pagan Yoruba gods descend upon 
earth, creating a more human-centred theology where “the passions of the deities are brought 
to a terrestrial level” (1976: 24). The conflation of Christianity and Yoruba paganism is 
extended a few pages later, where the representation of St Peter in the stained glass windows 
of the church is assumed to be an image of an egúngún, or ancestral spirit, in a Yoruba 
masquerade, since St Peter wears a robe like the egúngún’s. Fluid boundaries between zones 
of reality are explored with childhood relations and friends who commune with various kinds 
of spirits and the child Wole himself is terrified by the ghost of a dead Bishop whose eyeballs 
drop into his pocket-watch.  
 
Soyinka, in the ways described above, sets about constructing in Aké a body which, unlike the 
bodies constituted by Cartesian thought, is unbound.  Taylor refers to the subjectivity which 
is constituted by an “open boundary,” which is porous since it draws its source from an idea 
of truth located externally to itself (1989: 191). The body, unlimited by a procedurally rational 
worldview, enjoys a sympathetic relationship with the cosmos and is open to areas of 
experience which may not be verified in terms of the protocols of procedural rationalism. The 
rationality of the porous subject is, however, wholly verifiable within the protocols 
established by its enabling mythology. And mythology here is used not as “false story” but as 
constitutive story.  
 
Likewise, the line between adult reason and childhood irrationality is repeatedly erased in the 
narrative, but most memorably in the culmination of the rite of passage incident, referred to 
above, where the young Wole takes his first unaccompanied journey away from home. The 
trope of the colonial encounter, familiar from the imperial adventure story, but perhaps 
perfectly symbolically contained in Crusoe’s encounter with Friday, is ludicrously parodied in 
the encounter of the young Wole with the white police officer at the end of the parade of the 
police band. In the first place, the representative of colonial authority is assumed to be an 
albino, a freak of nature, since the child has never before seen a white man. The child notes 
that this uniformed official wears shoes, unlike the black policemen who go barefooted. Shoes 
are a repeated focus of speculation for the young Wole in the autobiography. The rules which 
circumscribe the wearing of shoes suggest that only adults are allowed to wear shoes. Thus, 
on account of his footwear the officer is assumed to be an adult. This assumption is 
undermined, however, by what the narrative presents as his ingratiating childishness. In a 
reversal of the protocols of the colonial encounter, the white officer addresses the child 
Soyinka (unlike Crusoe’s primal exchange with Friday) not in a rudimentary English, but in a 
completely garbled Yoruba, which the four-and-a half-year-old child recognizes to be one of 
the languages he speaks, but whose meaning he, in this distortion of it, cannot discern. The 
child expresses his confusion in English. The rest of the interview proceeds in English, but it 
is an English which to the ears of the black child the white man does not seem able to 
 
 
articulate particularly well. It is also an exchange where the adult comes off rather poorly for 
behaving in a more childish way than the child, as suggested by the officer’s response to the 
young child’s request to go home. The officer  replies fondly: “Well, that seems vum-vum-
vum.” (1981: 46)  
 
When asked his father’s name, the child responds to his interlocutor’s amusement that his 
father is known as “Headmaster” or by his other name “Essay”. The police officer laughs at 
what he takes to be the defective reason of a child. But, of course, “defective reason” masks 
the animist rationality of the child, where the spirit resides in the thing. This materialist 
rationality operates with the concrete rather than the abstract. In this sense meaning is 
shown to be immanent in the thing itself rather than residing in an etherealised spirit. In 
terms of this thinking, one’s name is what one is called. Since Wole’s father is hailed as 
“Headmaster” by some, alluding to his profession, and as “Essay” by others, alluding to his 
initials, “S.A.” standing in for “Samuel Ayodele”, these are logically construed by the child to 
be his names.  The logic which regards one’s true name as one’s baptismal name is not self-
evident but bound by convention. Again, this is just one example in a narrative which 
provides many others of an alternate animist rationality. In this scene Soyinka deconstructs 
Enlightenment dichotomies without relapsing to the notion of the unified “childhood of the 
race” since the child in question is highly intelligent. Furthermore, the child’s childhood 
“irrationality” exposes the conventional rather than self-evident nature of adult “rationality”.  
     What Aké thus appears to achieve is the representation of a fully modern identity out of an 
authentically Yoruba worldview, where, as Appiah suggests, as noted above,  “Yoruba” as a 
synecdoche is representative of the whole of Africa. The achievement of the autobiography 
may be contrasted with the project presented by Soyinka in another genre which also 
approaches its fully realized embodiment in the eighteenth century, namely the essays 
anthologized as Myth, Literature and the African World, in particular “The Fourth Stage”.  
(The essay, like the autobiography and the novel, is a genre which, in the practice of its 
progenitor, Montaigne, evolved as a constitutive literary medium for reflection on the 
individual.) If Aké shows, one might say “empirically” given the technique of representation 
of the autobiography, the emergence of the African individual, “The Fourth Stage” by rational 
argument tells the formation of modern African identity embodied in the Yoruba god, Ògún, 
In the figure of Ògún Soyinka dramatizes the symbolic African individual, most often 
embodied in the artist. The Ògún/artist figure paradoxically, in his destructive-regenerative 
being, sutures the individual and the social severed in European modernity. The reconnection 
of the individual and the social occurs since Ògún’s moment of individuation, in Soyinka’s 
representation of it, unlike the individualism of European modernity, is communicant.  This 
process occurs in the transitional abyss of the fourth space through the Ògún/artist figure’s 
superhuman cosmic will. As will be suggested through the analysis of the role of ritual 
scarification in Aké, the idea of the “will” associated with Ògún comes closer to the status of 
“willing” in the nineteenth century German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer, than it does 
to the concept of the will in Yoruba practice.  
 
Margaret Thompson Drewal prefaces an analysis of the embodied ritual initiation practices of 
a Yoruba diviner, Kolawole Ositola, with an observation about the self-reflection of Yoruba 
 
 
performers. Drewal observes that “Yoruba performers regard themselves as ‘people of action’ 
[an] idea [which] inheres in a Yoruba theory of action termed àse.” This, Drewal claims, “is 
one of those fundamental concepts like ‘will’ that philosophers write entire books about.” 
Drewal adds that, “[Àse] is at a very fundamental level understood by Yoruba performers as 
‘the power to bring things into existence,” or “the power to make things happen.” (1994: 171) 
As will be shown in the analysis of the scarification in Soyinka’s childhood autobiography, 
Yoruba “will” exists in an embodied social practice as a collective ideal. The will of which 
Ògún is the symbol in Soyinka’s aesthetic comes closer to the concept of will in 
Schopenhauer, who engages and partially rejects both Kantian rationalism and German 
Idealism. For Soyinka, as in Schopenhauer, the will is identified with the instinctual rather 
than rational drives of the introspective individual which produce art as a moral ideal.   
 
Underscoring the universality of the process of individuation, Soyinka stresses the 
continuities between the mythology of Grecian antiquity and contemporary Yoruba 
mythology. Ògún is, in part, the Yoruba counterpart of Prometheus and Dionysus. As Kwame 
Anthony Appiah notes, Soyinka’s rewriting of Yoruba mythology is filtered not coincidentally 
through Greek mythology. Negritude, it is well known, comes off rather poorly in Soyinka’s 
view. Regarding Negritude’s appropriation of the idea of African “emotionalism” in response 
to the “rationalism” of colonial self-definition, Soyinka retorts that: “A tiger does not proclaim 
his tigritude, he pounces.” (Jahn, 1966: 265) Negritude allows Africa to enter modernity 
through an embodied reinterpretation of the European concept of blackness forged out of the 
nineteenth-century science of race. Soyinka, by contrast, theorizes African entry into 
modernity through a Yoruba/African mythos read through an Enlightenment reinvention of 
Hellenic mythology. Ato Quayson suggests that Soyinka 
 transfer[s] the myths from its [sic] ritual contexts of performance, but by the extensive 
interpretation to which he submits them, their original terms are re-written so as to 
embrace new aesthetic, cultural, and even political realities that were not within their 
purview in other cultural uses. (1997: 75)  
The Yoruba metaphysics created out of this nexus, furthermore, as Ato Quayson notes, is a 
singular interpretation of the broad, accommodating and protean “church” of Yoruba 
tradition. In Ibadan the Soyinka figure, ‘Maren’, relates the profound moment when he 
comes across an old edition of William Blake’s Poems, one book among many a teacher 
wanted to pass on to pupils rather than discard. Maren is fascinated by the poems, as he was 
by the teacher’s exegesis in class of Blake’s “Tiger”: 
He had listened to Mr Kayes’s exposition of the poem with rapt interest and a little 
bafflement. As he read its companions in the volume, however, he felt somewhat more 
at home with the strange world of this possessed stranger, who appeared to share some 
of the theology of Aké, yet partook of the fantasy world of Fagunwa’s Ogboju Oke Ninu 
Igbo Irunmale, or indeed Ireke Onibudo. It was again an echo of the sensations he 
obtained when he stared at the stained-glass window of St Peter’s church at Aké where 
the haloed pictures of saints and founding missionaries of the church fused with the 
masked figures of egungun. (1994: 150-151)  
The affinity with Blake is highly understandable. Like Blake, Soyinka constructs a personal 
mythology out of Yoruba cosmology. Donald Cosentino in “Repossession: Ògún in Folklore 
 
 
and Literature,” explores the multiple ways in which Yoruba mythology, in particular the 
figure of Ògún, the god of iron, war and hunting, has entered the contemporary cultures of 
West Africa and the West African diaspora. Cosentino observes that Soyinka has created a 
“personal Ògún” that “exists on at least three permeable levels: the personal, the critical, and 
the artistic” (1997: 305). The figure of Ògún here acts as a metonym for Yoruba mythology 
broadly. What is noticeably absent in Cosentino’s assessment of the use of mythology by 
Soyinka, is any sense of Ògún binding the artist to an ideal held in common through a 
collective practice.  
   
What the analysis of Aké, drawing on its similarity to the Bildungsroman, and the project of 
the essays suggest, is that far from demonstrating the entry of the African subject into 
modernity from an autochthonous African soil, the identity suggested at the outset is a 
fundamentally modern idea of the self. The formation of the prior assumed identity for whom 
questions of “authenticity” now begin to appear on the horizon is not narrated in the 
autobiography or theorized in the essays. Unlike many other African 
autobiographies/Bildungsromane, there is no alienation from an embedded identity, no 
nostalgia in exile, or, in its other embodiment, ironic distance from the process which 
transforms the person into the individual which forms the dominant tone of other African life 
narratives. Questions of identity and authenticity are wholly modern questions. Soyinka’s 
project allows the accretion of an African gloss onto an already modern sense of self, where 
the idea of “Africa” also is a response to modern colonialism. Nowhere do these 
contradictions become more apparent than in the incident of the ritual scarification described 
in Aké, the essential outlines of which are foreshadowed in the adventure where the boy 
follows the police band to Ibara. 
In order to understand the role of ritual scarification in Aké and in Soyinka’s reflection 
on his formation as artist, one needs to understand the significance of scarification among the 
Yoruba more generally. Henry John Drewal traces the mythological origin of the significance 
of body marking among the Yoruba to the proverb attested to the god, Olorun, bidding the 
human being: “open your hand, here are lines” (244). The lines on the palms of the hands are 
then further elaborated on other parts of the body in the patterns inscribed through 
scarification and cicatrisation. Among the Yoruba, scarification has a wide range of 
significances and meanings. Drewal observes that: “Some marks localize a person in time and 
space, indicating indelibly an individual’s place and condition in a broad cultural and 
ontological system” (244). Scarification sometimes indicates “conditions of birth” as with 
àbíkú children who die and return to plague their mothers. Some body markings “indicate the 
presence of younger siblings or relations” (244). The practice of sympathetic scarification also 
exists where relatives of young people about to undergo circumcision and cicatrization are 
marked themselves to “remind them to handle the child gently” (1997: 244). Body markings 
are considered sexually attractive and sometimes are regarded as constituting new erogenous 
zones. They are also sometimes an indication of inherited occupation, cult membership or 
mourning. Scarification also has “curative or protective” associations, being performed as a 
form of medicine or prophylaxis. Body markings are also a somatic index of strength in the 
face of pain, highly valued among the Yoruba (1997: 244-247).  
 
 
 
Body markings evoke the god, Ògún, in a number of ways. Drewal notes that the olóòlà or 
body artist is a devotee and is “an extension and manifestation” (1997: 255) of the god, in the 
sense that through circumcision, excision, scarification, cicatrisation or tattooing he forms 
the human being through initiating him/her into the various stations and statuses on the 
road of life. Drewal suggests that: “[l]ike Ògún, who creates order by transforming the forest 
into farms and cities, and who tames society by judging disruptive individuals, the olóòlà 
helps to create order by visibly placing individuals in a larger social and cosmic universe” 
(1997: 255) [emphasis added]. In other words, the significance of scarification is that it 
literally and figuratively cuts a passage through the person to open the person up to her/his 
place in a broader social network. Initiation among the Yoruba, in keeping with the flexibility 
which is the hallmark of the culture, is not a rigidly structured ritual and may vary from area 
to area. There is no fixed age at which initiation is required and often the initiation practice is 
at the request of the particular young person. Initiation among the Yoruba also does not 
create new forms of community across the age group initiated at one ceremony. Scarification 
literally and metaphorically opens the person up to a cosmic network, encompassing zones of 
reality inconceivable to procedural rationality.   
 
Curiously, the role of scarification in Aké cannot be determined with any specificity since it 
does not appear to form part of an identifiable collective practice. Ritual scarification appears 
in some ways to be associated with the rites of passage. Its symbolic meaning is not 
completely clear since it comes upon the boy hero unexpectedly and its potential significance 
is only elliptically determined from the general context of its performance. The scarification is 
undertaken by Soyinka’s paternal grandfather at his country estate at Ìsarà where “Essay” and 
his family visit every Christmas. Ìsarà is represented in the narrative, in counterpoint to the 
colonial Christianity of Aké, as pagan, worshipping the gods of the Yoruba fathers. Indeed, in 
the sequence leading up to the scarification, mention is made for the first time by the 
grandfather of the deity, Ògún. As has been noted above, in Soyinka’s theoretical reflections 
on his art, Ògún comes to embody the “willful” boundary breaking artist, communicant in his 
individuality. The child explains to the grandfather how the advice of a neighbour fortuitously 
saves him from an attack by bees. The grandfather does not regard the incident as 
coincidental at all. He suggests instead that Wole is under the protection of a divinity: “Ògún 
protects his own”(1981: 140), the old man proposes. The fact that Soyinka has been shaped by 
a worldview which is not the worldview enabled by Yoruba mythology is attested by the first 
person narrator’s lack of familiarity with the deity Ògún. The young Wole remarks that he 
“had heard that name before” (1981: 140). He knows only that Ògún is the name of a pagan 
devil. The significance of Ògún to Soyinka’s metaphysics and aesthetic is a retrospective 
reinvention. 
 
What is interesting about the representation of the rite of passage incident in Aké, if that 
indeed is what it is, is that it occurs entirely without social context. The grandfather engages 
in a coded conversation with the child about schoolyard bullying and his forthcoming 
relocation at the age of nine-and-a-half to Government College, Ibadan, where he will be 
parentless, “sharing desks with MEN, not boys!” (1981: 143). He then summons the child to 
sleep at his house. Shortly before daybreak, the child is unexpectedly woken and the rite is 
 
 
performed by an elderly man with his assistant. It involves slashing an “arc of incisions” 
(1981: 146) on both ankles and both wrists. The grandfather warns the child not to cry out 
despite the pain. The child is evidently a stranger to the techniques of the procedure about to 
be performed, as well as its significance to personal and corporate existence. It is rather 
surprising to learn later, since scarification is a permanent and highly visible mark of 
incorporation, that he is not certain whether his father underwent the rite. In the context one 
thus assumes that the ordeal is an initiation into manhood, an assumption to a certain extent 
affirmed by its recollection in Ibadan in an incident where the protagonist has been injured 
by being thrown through a glass door. Since the author figure has endured the physical test of 
“initiation”, his foot may be stitched without anaesthetic but with fortitude. The boy hero 
does not cry in pain (1994: 134-135). This conclusion is challenged however by a parallel 
reading where it appears that the rite may provide ritual protection against poisoning. The 
grandfather pointedly tells the child after the operation that he will be able instinctively to 
intuit whether food offered him is good or tainted. 
 
What distinguishes this initiation, if initiation is what it is, from rite of passage ceremonies 
generally is the absence of social framing of the experience. Initiation is “one of the most 
widely distributed human customs,” (Bettelheim, 1962: 15) which Arnold Van Gennep, Victor 
Turner, and Joseph Campbell among others argue acquires its social-symbolic function in the 
initiate’s collectively acknowledged departure from the community, initiation into tribal law 
(often ineradicably inscribed through mutilation), and return, marked with new status, to the 
fold of the community. This voyage of self-discovery is dictated by a social code. The 
acquisition of both experience and new status are enabled and determined by an 
acknowledged practice which recedes into time immemorial. The initiate rejoins the social 
world charged with new responsibilities and rights which derive from the social code. Often 
the rite of passage creates new horizontal communities by age group. Mutilation, whether by 
tattooing, scarification, circumcision or subincision, is the visible index of transformed social 
role or status. While the Yoruba do not share all of the elements of the practices of initiation 
present in other cultures, what is common is the idea of some form of rite of passage 
determined by a social code. 
 
What is unusual about Aké, unlike virtually every other African autobiography where 
initiation is described, is the fact that the reader is unable to determine with any degree of 
specificity the social significance of the rite. The child’s experience exists almost as a series of 
images among the range of other experiences out of which he makes sense of his world. The 
rite is disembedded from the practices within which it acquires its social significance and 
becomes in the process a uniquely personal experience in the life journey of the disengaged 
subject. It is no longer a rite ordained since time immemorial through which the self is 
socially realized, since the self which is scripted in the autobiography/Bildungsroman is a self 
which apparently submits to no order outside of a personally constructed order. The young 
Wole does not submit to Yoruba custom. He does not prostrate himself as required by Yoruba 
etiquette when greeting elders.  He proclaims to a visiting chief: “ If I don’t prostrate myself to 
God, why should I prostrate to you?” (1981: 128) 
 
 
 
Scarification in Aké does not, however, represent the alternative lifestyle of “modern 
primitivism” which paradoxically in its challenge to the commodification of late-capitalist, 
post-industrialized society itself has become commodified. “Primitive” body modification, 
tattooing, scarification and other body art, is fashionable. Modern primitivism is a utopian 
liberatory project which challenges the deindividualization generated by Enlightenment 
separation of the poetic and scientific through the hyperindividualization promised by 
“primitive” body modification practices. Body modification in Aké plays a different role. By 
deftly occluding the Yoruba social code within which the scarification ritual originates and 
acquires significance and transforming it into the life experience of its autonomous hero, Aké 
is able to present the “universal verity” of modern identity emerging out of African soil.  
 
But the narrative ironically also exposes the deindividualization which follows the process of 
individualization which Soyinka presents as authentically African and liberatory. There is a 
pessimism in the narrating voice of the adult Soyinka returning to his childhood haunts to 
find them submitting to a commodifying global order. Opposed to the located individualism 
traced in the autobiography, globalization enforces individual conformity. The narrator 
points to the conformity created both by commodities and the commodification of art by the 
culture industry. Rather than the sound of the egungun parade or the police band, Aké is host 
to “the raucous clang of hand-bells advertising bargain sales of imported wares” (1981: 149) 
from “a variety of stores peddling the products of a global waste industry” (1981: 149).  When 
the adult narrator returns, the inhabitants of Aké, rather than enjoying the charms of 
operettas at Centenary Hall, appear to have succumbed to Hollywood: photo-frames now 
carry the “white voluptuous bodies” of  “Raquel Welch, Marilyn Monroe, Diana Dors, Jane 
Russell” and “Greta Garbo” (1981: 149). Global homogeneity unfortunately is the product of 
the same modernity for which Soyinka finds autochthonous African roots.  
 
But to return to the question of the scarification in Aké. The scarification thus is symbolic of 
the formation of a modern, disengaged African individual who, unlike the subject of Cartesian 
modernity, is unbound and open to the spirit which resides in material reality. What Soyinka 
forges is the individual who is “disembedded” but not “disenchanted”. This may be contrasted 
with another attempt to write the African subject into modernity. Richard Wright’s 
autobiography, dealing with his travels in the Gold Coast in the mid 1950s, concludes with 
some revulsion at the “rituals”, “mystery, magic” and “witchcraft” he encounters.  He suggests 
that what the African subject must develop, in contrast to Soyinka’s disengaged but 
unbounded self, is a boundedness: 
I found only one intangible but vitally important element in the heritage of tribal 
culture that militated against cohesiveness of action: African culture has not developed 
the personalities of the people to a degree that their egos are stout, hard, sharply 
defined; there is too much cloudiness in the African’s mentality, a kind of sodden 
vagueness that makes for lack of confidence, an absence of focus that renders that 
mentality incapable of grasping the workaday world. And until confidence is 
established at the center of African personality, until there is an inner reorganization 
of that personality, there can be no question of marching from the tribal order to the 
twentieth century. (2008: 410) 
 
 
Clearly thus for Wright as opposed to Soyinka, the modern African individual is an individual 
who must be both “disembedded” and “disenchanted”. 
 
Furthermore, for Soyinka, the modern African self must remain connected to other selves 
thus conceived. This dimension of the subject emerges most clearly in the context of the 
forced introspection engendered by the solitary confinement imposed by the Gowon regime 
explored in The Man Died (Prison Notes). Here, Soyinka suggests that “[a]ny faith that places 
the conscious quest for the inner self as goal, for which the context of forces are mere battle 
aids is ultimately destructive of the social potential of that self” (1972: 87) [emphasis added]. 
Thus, self-realization is not achieved when “inner self” reflexively becomes its own 
fulfillment. Soyinka suggests instead that “inner self” should be kept only as a source of 
“strength” and “vision”: “inner self” should remain only “an unconscious beneficiary from 
experience” (1972: 87), but the ultimate goal is the connection of the morally autonomous self 
to other morally autonomous selves.  
 
The significance of the scarification in Aké is that it is the symbolic moment in the 
autobiography which points to the need for the self to be unbound in Soyinka’s conception of 
the individual. In other words, the subject needs to be opened up to the material and spiritual 
worlds in a way constitutively denied by procedural rationality. The self for Soyinka must be 
connected with the world and with other zones of reality. This idea is vital since it forms part 
of the worldview of all of the cultures of continental Africa.  What emerges clearly in much of 
Soyinka’s reflections, but most clearly in the excerpt from the prison notes quoted above, is 
that Soyinka values the “social potential” of the self. This phrase refers to the way in which 
one subject is inescapably connected with other subjects. In Soyinka’s thought it is the idea of 
the “cosmic will” of the artist who, like Ògún, opens a path which re-establishes the links 
between subjects. What is suggested here, however, is that it is not “cosmic will” which 
creates connections. Instead, the person who locates his idea of self-realization in a social 
code is inherently “structurally” opened up in the way Soyinka desires.  But this is an idea to 
which Soyinka constitutively cannot submit as a consequence of a conception of the self 
generated out of limitless freedom rather than freedom realized through recognition of 
necessary constraint. The scarification in Aké literally “unbinds” the body in the slashing of 
ankles and wrists. For the body to be more profoundly unbound it must submit to the 
paradoxically liberating bind of a social ideal – a possibility which does not exist within the 
framework of Soyinka’s self-conception. 
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